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ABSTRACT 
This paper reviews the present dispute resolution process used by the Office of the Pri vacy 
Commissioner. The paper focuses on access to personal information disputes as these make up 
approximately 30 per cent of all disputes handled by the Office of the Privacy Commissioner and are 
arguably the type of disputes most affected by any delays in the resolution process. 
The development of privacy related legislation in New Zealand is charted with an emphas is 
on access to personal information and dispute resolution procedures in the legislation . This paper 
discusses the investigative dispute resolution process in the Privacy Act 1993 and how the 
investigative process is carried out in practice by the Office of the Privacy Commissioner. The 
value of the investigative process is assessed. 
The paper then considers a two-stream approach for the resolution of access to information 
disputes using courts or tribunals as an alternative to the present process provided by the Offi ce of 
the Privacy Commissioner. 
The findings of this paper are that a two stream approach for access to information pri vacy 
disputes should be adopted with District Courts providing the second stream to the current system 
through the Office of the Privacy Commissioner. 
The text of this paper (excluding contents page, footnotes and annexures) comprises 14,30 I 
words. 
I INTRODUCTION 
The object of this paper is to consider whether the present dispute resolution 
scheme under the Privacy Act 1993 is the most effective way to resolve privacy 
disputes in New Zealand involving access to personal information. The paper will 
focus on issues concerning access to personal information disputes under the 
Privacy Act 1993 and consider how to address these issues. 
The principal problem with the current dispute resolution scheme in the 
Privacy Act 1993 is the length of time it takes for the Office of the Privacy 
Commissioner to resolve disputes. In a 1999 survey of 13 consumer complaints 
bodies, the Consumers' Institute gave the Privacy Commissioner a "poor" rating for 
the speed in which disputes were resolved. 1 In the year to June 2003, the Office of 
the Privacy Commissioner resolved only 56 per cent of complaints in under six 
months of their receipt.2 This paper will consider whether there are options that 
would allow faster resolution of privacy disputes, particularly for disputes 
involving access to personal information. 3 The options that will be considered in 
addition to the current investigative scheme are adversarial schemes utilising courts 
or tribunals. 
The prompt resolution of access to information disputes is important because 
time may be of the essence in obtaining the information - the infotmation may not 
be much use to the complainant unless it can be obtained promptly. Methods of 
resolving access to personal information disputes need a process that is fast and 
allows the parties to reach a result with the costs, both direct, such as court fees and 
indirect, such as legal fees and opportunity cost arising from delays, kept to a 
mm1mum. Access disputes are arguably more time sensitive than disclosure 
complaints4 where the damage has already been done. In disclosure disputes the 
1 Consumers' Institute "The Slow Trail to Justice" (September 1999) Co11su111er New Zealand 10. 2 Privacy Commissioner Report of the Privacy Co111111issioner for the Year Ended 30 June 2003 
(A I 1, Wellington, November 2003) 21 [Report of the Privacy Commissioner for the Year Ended 30 
June 2003] . 
3 Access to personal information is used in terms of information privacy principle 6 of the Pri vacy 
Act 1993. 
4 Disclosure of personal information is used in terms of information privacy principle S(a)(ii) of the 
Privacy Act 1993. 
4 
focus is on a reaching a settlement, whereas access complaints are situations where 
damage can be prevented, or at least mitigated, with prompt intervention and 
resolution. Access to information complaints was also the largest single category, 
over 30 per cent, of all complaints received by the Office of the Privacy 
Commissioner in 2002/2003. 5 Historically, disputes about access to information 
have been the most numerous type of complaint.6 Therefore, providing alternative 
methods of resolving access disputes has the potential to significantly reduce the 
work load of the Office of the Privacy Commissioner and allow resources to be 
reprioritised. As well, obtaining access to personal information is recognised as a 
very important privacy right, Tim McBride has stated: 7 
The right of data subjects to obtain access to personal information about them is 
regarded as one of the fundamental components of all the modern formulations of 
data privacy principles. It has been described as the "golden rule" of modern data 
protection law. 
This paper focuses on access to information disputes as access disputes are 
better suited to a two-stream disputes process that also uses a short hearing or 
interlocutory application procedure than, say, disputes over disclosure of 
information. A short hearing can utilise the expertise of the judge to decide whether 
the document, or part thereof, in question should be disclosed or whether it attracts 
privilege or contains a trade secret and can therefore be withheld. 8 
An investigative process like that used by the Privacy Commissioner or, in 
the alternative, a full court hearing where witnesses can be examined, is better 
suited to a case where a document was incorrectly disclosed in order to quantify 
any damage to the complaint. In disclosure situations, it is a question of assessing 
5 There were 36 l access complaints made in 2002/2003 out of a total of 1202 complaints received. 
See "Report of the Privacy Commissioner for the Year Ended 30 June 2003", above n 2, 26. 6 Privacy Commissioner Review of the Privacy Act 1993: Discussion Papers - A compilation of 12 
discussion papers released between July and September 1997 (Auckland, December 1997) DP3 , 3. 
See also Elizabeth Longworth and Tim McBride The Privacy Act: A Guide (G P Publications, 
Wellington, 1994) 149. 
7 Tim McBride Data Protection: an options paper (Department of Justice, Wellington, 1987) 60 
["Data Protection: an options paper"]. 
8 Privacy Act I 993, s 28. 
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the credibility of the parties, the harm caused and the quantum of damages rather 
than taking a document and deciding whether someone should have access to it. 
This paper builds on my experiences as a privacy officer for a large company 
dealing with requests for personal information under the Privacy Act 1993 and 
working with the Office of the Privacy Commissioner to resolve complaints 
involving customers of my employer. 
My findings are that a two-stream approach to privacy disputes involving 
access to personal information, where complainants can choose between the current 
investigative scheme provided by the Privacy Commissioner and an adversarial 
scheme in the court system will provide greater flexiblility for complainants. A two 
stream approach has the potential to reduce the delay complainants cunently face. 
Both streams have the potential to provide cost effective dispute resolution when 
both direct and indirect costs are taken into account. A fair result can be obtained 
with regard to due process without tying the participants up in legalese . 
II BACKGROUND 
New Zealand society in the twenty first century faces many threats to the 
privacy of the individual. Changing and iterating computer technology means that 
the collection and processing of information continually becomes faster and easier. 9 
Trying to safeguard individual privacy is often a rear guard action. Those 
interested in protecting the privacy of the individual may not accept the 
introduction of processes such as data matching, however they have to move on to 
the next privacy threat. When new technology allowing processes such as data 
matching between government agencies is implemented, there is really no going 
back once a process is introduced as the process rapidly becomes entrenched. 
Considering threats to pnvacy m a paper considering different types of 
dispute resolution for privacy disputes is important. This is because of the effect 
the choice of dispute resolution systems has on the allocation of resources in the 
9 For a useful background on the exponential growth of computer processing power see New 
Zealand Law Society Business Online - the Legal Issues (New Zealand Law Society, Wellington , 
2002) 5. 
6 
Office of the Privacy Commissioner. Like other government entities, the Office of 
the Privacy Commissioner has a limited budget: in the year to June 2003 the total 
operating revenue was $2,185,000. 10 If a significant part of the budget and 
resources of the Office of the Privacy Commissioner is devoted to dispute 
resolution, there is less funding and resources available for other areas such as 
addressing threats to privacy. 11 Assuming the overall budget for the Office of the 
Privacy Commissioner remains constant, the design and options available to 
complainants in the privacy dispute resolution system could have a significant 
effect on focus as a whole of the Office of the Privacy Commissioner. Controlling 
the inflow of complaints by providing other options for the resolution of 
complaints is a valid way of dealing with the issue of delays in the Office of the 
Privacy Commissioner. 
A Common Law 
In common law there are traditional duties of confidentiality that arise in 
particular relationships. Common law duties of confidentiality are found in the 
relationship between an individual and their banker and priest respectively and in 
the course of employment. 12 A bank's duty of confidentiality to their customer is an 
implied term of their contract. 13 This implied term of confidentiality is overriden 
when there is a statutory duty to disclose infom1ation, such as to Inland Revenue.14 
These duties of confidentiality are limited to particular relationships and it 1s 
important to note that they do not confer rights of access to personal infomrntion. 
However, as this section of my paper illustrates, the enactment of legislation 
covering personal information illustrates that Parliament recognised that there were 
many situations, whether or not covered by common law duties of confidentiality, 
10"Report of the Privacy Commissioner for the Year Ended 30 June 2003", above n 2, 142. 11 The Office of the Privacy Commissioner spent $2,052 ,000 supplying "outputs" to the Crown. 
There are six outputs, one of which is complaints resolution and compliance. The Office of the 
Privacy Commissioner's Annual Report does not provide individual budgets for each of the six 
outputs. See "Report of the Privacy Commissioner for the Year Ended 30 June 2003 ", above n 2, 
145. 
12 Sally Fitzgerald and Victoria Heine Confidential fllformation (New Zealand Law Society, 
Wellington 2002) 30. 
13 The Laws of New Zealand (Butterworths Wellington 1999) Banking, 35, para 27 . 14 The Laws of New Zealand, above, n 13. 
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where people had a legitimate expectation that their personal information should be 
accessible. Key parts of the legislation were dispute resolution processes to deal 
with problems in accessing personal information. This discussion of legislation 
focuses on provisions allowing access to personal information and that deal with 
disputes around access to personal information. 
B Wanganui Computer Centre Act 1976 
The Wanganui Computer Centre Act 1976 was passed to allow the 
establishment of a government computer system run by the State Services 
Commission to hold information from the Police, Ministry of Justice and the 
Ministry of Transport. 15 The legislation allowed individuals to access the 
information held on the computer system unless the release of the information was 
likely to be detrimental to the administration of justice. 16 
A key part of the Wanganui Computer Centre Act 1976 was the appointment 
of a Wanganui Computer Centre Privacy Commissioner. 17 If an individual believed 
that the information recorded on the Wanganui computer about them was 
inaccurate or misleading they could complain to the Commissioner. 18 The 
Commissioner would then investigate the complaint. 19 If after investigating a 
complaint, the Commissioner believed the complaint was valid, the Commissioner 
had the power to direct the department concerned to amend the information. 20 If 
the information was not corrected to the Commissioner's satisfaction, the 
Commissioner was able to report the matter to the Prime Minister. 21 
In hindsight, the powers of the Wanganui Computer Centre Privacy 
Commissioner were a prelude to the Official Information Act 1982. The notion that 
citizens should have the ability to access and correct their personal information held 
by the state was a major advance on the then current Official Secrets Act 1951. As 
15 See the long title to the Wanganui Computer Centre Act 1976. 
16 Wanganui Computer Centre Act 1976, s 14. 
17 Wanganui Computer Centre Act 1976, s 5. 
18 Wanganui Computer Centre Act 1976, s 15. 
19 Wanganui Computer Centre Act 1976, s 16. 
20 Wanganui Computer Centre Act 1976, s 17. 
2 1 Wanganui Computer Centre Act 1976, s 17. 
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far as the disputes process operated, investigations were conducted in private22 and 
investigations were free for complainants.23 The Commissioner was provided with 
flexibility as to how investigations were to be conducted24 and the power to 
summon people. 25 The Privacy Act 1993 repealed the Wanganui Computer Centre 
Act 1976. 
There are parallels between the powers and processes of the Wanganui 
Computer Centre Privacy Commissioner and the current Privacy Commissioner. 
The key parallels were the Wanganui Computer Centre Privacy Commissioner was 
an independent authority, had investigative powers and provided a free service. 
The key difference was that the Wanganui Computer Centre Privacy Commissioner 
had the power to compel departments to amend information.26 The current Privacy 
Commissioner has only recommendatory powers. 27 Overall, the Wanganui 
Computer Centre Privacy Commissioner provided a signpost as to the powers for 
the current Privacy Commissioner. 
C Human Rights Commission Act 1977 
Prior to the Privacy Commissioner Act 1991 and then the Privacy Act 1993, 
the Human Rights Commission Act 1977 provided with Human Rights 
Commission with powers in relation to individual privacy. Part five of the Human 
Rights Commission Act 1977 set out the functions of the Human Rights 
Commission in relation to privacy. It did not have the power to investigate 
infringements of privacy.28 Instead, the powers provided to the Human Rights 
Commission were essentially policy related with the power to report to the Prime 
Minister on privacy issues. 29 Part five of the Human Rights Commission Act 1977 
was repealed when the Privacy Commissioner Act 1991 was introduced.30 Overall, 
22 Wanganui Computer Centre Act 1976, s 9(3). 
23 Wanganui Computer Centre Act 1976, s 14(5). 
24 Wanganui Computer Centre Act 1976, s 9(1). 
25 Wanganui Computer Centre Act 1976, s 16A(2). 
26 Wanganui Computer Centre Act 1976, s 17( 1 ). 
27 Note that the exception in section 11 ( 1) of the Privacy Act 1993 does provide a legal right in 
respect of information held by a public sector agency, however, this right is enforceable through th e 
courts rather than by the Privacy Commissioner. 
28 Human Rights Commission Act 1977, s 67(3). 
29 Human Rights Commission Act 1977, s 67(1). 
30 See Longworth and McBride, above n 6, 38. 
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the Human Rights Act 1977 provided no significant advance for individuals 
seeking to access their personal information. 
D Official Information Act 1982 
The Official Inforn1ation Act 1982 had a fundamental effect on a New 
Zealander's ability to access information held by government agencies.31 The 
Official Information Act 1982 grew out of the New Zealand Committee on Official 
Information's report Towards Open Government published in 1981. 32 Towards 
Open Government signalled a shift away from the presumption in the Official 
Secrets Act 1951 "that information should not be disclosed without 
authorisation. "33 It set out a range of reasons to support access to information such 
as promoting participation in government processes and the accountability of civil 
servants and politicians. 34 Consequently, the report proposed moving to a 
presumption in regards to information held by government that "information should 
be made available unless there is good reason to withhold it. "35 
In discussing information about individuals, Towards Open Government sets 
out a number of concepts subsequently incorporated into the Privacy Act 1993 :36 
Within the context of greater ava ilability of information, frequ ent concern has been 
expressed that individual citizens should be able to ascertain the existance of, and 
have access to, information on their personal affairs that the go vernment has 
collected and holds. This concern has been shown principall y but by no means 
solely in relation to information held in computer databanks. 
3 1 See Longworth and McBride, above n 6, 110 and McBride, above n 7, 62. 
32 New Zealand Committee on Official Information Towards Open Government (Government 
Printer, Wellington, 1981) ["Towards Open Government"]. See also " Data Protection : an opti ons 
paper", above n 7, 34. 
33 Towards Open Government, above n 32, 13 . 
34 Towards Open Government, above n 32, 14. 
35 Towards Open Government, above n 32, 21 . 
36 Towards Open Government, above n 32, 16. 
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Towards Open Government also stated that as well as the ability to access 
personal information, the ability to correct personal information was also 
important: 37 
There is a strong body of opinion, which we share, that, with only the necessary 
exception, individuals should be able to know and if necessary have corrected what 
personal information is held by departments or agencies. A precendent, which 
shows Parliament ' s acceptance of the principle, is to be found in the Wanganui 
Computer Centre Act 1976. 
Prior to the enactment of the Privacy Act 1993, the Official Information Act 
1982 provided individuals and bodies corporate with the right of access to38 and 
correction of39 their own personal information held by government entities with 
various exceptions for information deemed to be commercially sensitive40 or 
security related.41 This has now changed: the jurisdiction in relation to individuals 
accessing their personal information is now under the Privacy Act 1993 . As the 
Law Commission states the current relationship between the Official Information 
Act 1982 and the Privacy Act 1993 is: 42 
Since 1993 , requests for personal information by natural persons about themselves 
have been considered under the Privacy Act 1993. 43 Part IV of the Official 
Information Act, and the equivalent provisions of the Local Government Official 
Information and Meetings Act, now apply only in respect of requests by bodies 
corporate for personal information about themselves, where those bodies are 
incorporated in New Zealand or have a place of business here. 
The Official Information Act 1982 covers information held by central 
government organisations.44 The Local Government Official Inf01mation and 
37 Towards Open Government, above n 32, 16. 
38 Official Information Act 1982, s 24(1 ). 
39 Official Information Act 1982, s 26( I). 
40 Official Information Act 1982, s 9( I )(b). 
41 
Official Information Act 1982, s 6(a). 
42 New Zealand Law Commission Review of the Official Information Act 1981 (NZLC R40, 
Wellington , 1997) I 00 (emphasis in the original). 
43 Principle 6 and Part IV of the Privacy Act 1993 (footnote in the original). 
44 The government organisations are listed in the Official Information Act 1982, I st sch and the 
Ombudsmen Act 1975, I st sch . 
II 
Meetings Act 1987 is the equivalent for councils and other territorial authorities. 
Schedule one of the Official Information Act 1982 lists the organisations that are 
subject to the Act. The Local Government Official Information and Meetings Act 
1987 also allowed individuals to access45 and correct46 personal information and 
principle six of the Privacy Act 1993 in relation to personal information is 
expressly incorporated.47 Both Acts define personal information as any official 
information held about an identifiable person.48 Both Acts cover accessing 
information held by government organisations beyond just personal information. 
Individuals49 and incorporated groups have the right to take a complaint to the 
Ombudsman if a government organisation refuses an application for access to 
information. This right is required to be spelt out to the applicant if the application 
is refused. so 
The Ombudsman has the power to investigate and review any decision made 
by a central or local government organisation about official information, including 
personal information. 51 The Ombudsman has the power to request inforn1ation 
from the organisation related to the investigation52 and may consult with the 
Privacy Commissioner during the investigation. 53 The Office of the Ombudsmen 
has developed a practice guideline to deal with the interface between the Privacy 
Act 1993 and the Official Information Act 1982. 54 Once the Ombudsman has 
reviewed the decision, the Ombudsman publishes a recommendation. It is rare that 
45 Local Government Official Information and Meetings Act 1987, s 23 . 
46 Local Government Official Information and Meetings Act 1987, s 25. 
47 Local Government Official In formation and Meetings Act 1987, s I 0( I A). 
48 Local Government Official Information and Meetings Act 1987, s 2; Official Information Act 
1982, s 2. 
49 The individual does not need to a New Zealand citi zen , you can just be in New Zealand : Offici a l 
Information Act 1982, s 21. 
50 Local Government Official Information and Meetings Act 1987, s 18(b); Official Information Act 
1982, s 19(b). 
5 1 Local Government Official Information and Meetings Act 1987, s 27; Official Information Act 
1982, s 28. 
52 Local Government Official Information and Meetings Act 1987, s 29 ; Offici a l Information Act 
1982, s 29A. 
53 Local Government Official Information and Meetings Act 1987, s 29A; Official Information Act 
1982, s 298. 
54 Office of the Ombudsman Practice Guidelines No.6 (Office of the Ombudsman, Wellington, 
1994). 
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a recommendation of the Ombudsman made under the Official Information Act 
1982 is not accepted; in the year to June 2003 all the recommendations were 
accepted. 55 A recent example of a recommendation of an Ombudsman not being 
accepted is a complaint involving the Southern Institute of Technology in 
Invercargill. A report was made to Parliament on the matter. 56 The report is 
comprehensive and contains copies of correspondence between the Office of the 
Ombudsman and the Southern Institute of Technology. The nature of the report 
and the fact that it is presented to Parliament means that the organisation concerned 
is placed under public scrutiny. 
The recommendation of the Ombudsman is binding on the organisation 
concerned unless specific action is taken, in contrast to a recommendation of the 
Privacy Commissioner. The specific action required, if the request relates to central 
government, is the Governor General has to make an order in council to negate the 
request. 57 If the request relates to a local authority, the local authority must hold a 
meeting and pass a resolution opposing the recommendation. 58 This decision must 
then be publicly notified. 59 There is a right of appeal for a review of the order in 
council or the local authority meeting to the High Court with a further appeal to the 
Court of Appeal. 60 These statutory duties to comply with a recommendation of the 
Ombudsman were lost as far as personal information was concerned when the 
jurisdiction for access to personal information was transferred to the Privacy 
Commissioner in 1993. 
The main criticisms that can be levelled at the Official Information Act 1982 
and the Local Government Official Information and Meetings Act 1987 are the 
exceptions in the legislation that can be used to stop the release of information and 
the potential for delays in resolving disputes. For the year ended 30 June 2003, the 
55 Office of the Ombudsmen Report of the Ombudsmen for the Year Ended 30 June 2003 (A3 , 
Wellington, 2003) 30 ["Report of the Ombudsmen for the Year Ended 30 June 2003"]. 
56 Office of the Ombudsman Report of Ombudsman Mel Smith 011 a Complaint against the Southern 
Institute of Technology by six former students (a3A(04), Wellington, 2004) ["Report of Ombudsman 
Mel Smith on a Complaint against the Southern Institute of Technology by six former students"]. 57 Official Information Act 1982, s 32. 
58 Local Government Official Information and Meetings Act 1987, s 32. 
59 Local Government Official Information and Meetings Act 1987, s 33. 
60 Local Government Official Information and Meetings Act 1987, ss 34 and 35; Official 
Information Act I 982, ss 328 and 32C. 
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average time taken by the Office of the Ombudsmen to resolve an official 
information complaint was 72 days.61 In addition to this, the government 
organisation has up to 20 working days to respond to the initial information 
request. 62 This has the potential to add up to a considerable delay in getting the 
information. 63 It is important to note that the Official Information Act 1982 does 
allow for urgent requests. 64 This is to enable a request to be met faster than the 
standard 20 working days. There is no equivalent urgent request provision in the 
Privacy Act 1993. Any urgent request provisions need to have very clear criteria as 
to when they can be invoked and what constitutes an urgent response time from the 
agency. There is the risk that unless there are clear criteria for an urgent request, 
some people seeking information will class their request as urgent simply because 
the facility is available. 
When compared to the Privacy Commissioner, the Ombudsman can also be 
described as an investigative model of dispute resolution. 65 There is the same sort 
of style of "off the papers" investigation procedure. Other similarities are that 
lodging a complaint with the Ombudsman is free and the process is private.66 A 
useful discussion of the ombudsman model of dispute resolution was written by 
Howard Gadlin: 67 
The classical ombudsman notion is located for the most part, but with some important 
deviations, within the tradition of adversarial dispute resolution . The classical 
ombudsman can compel cooperation with the investigation whereas a mediator, in 
most instances, depends on the voluntary cooperation of the parties with the mediation 
process. Also unlike a mediator, the classical ombudsman is an adjudicator. A citizen 
initiates a complaint about some sort of maladministration and an ombudsman 
investigates the complaint and renders a judgment about whether the complaint is 
61 "Report of the Ombudsmen for the Year Ended 30 June 2003", above n 55 , 41. 62 Official Information Act I 982, s 15 . 
63 For a useful discussion see Office of the Privacy Commissioner Official illfor111atio11 Act could 
help with problems Private Word Issue 20, November 1998 and New Zealand Law Comm1ss1on 
Review of the Official Information Act l 982 (NZLC R40, Wellington, 1997) 59. 64 Official Information Act 1982, s 12(3). 
65 Privacy Commissioner Necessary and Desirable: Privacy Act /993 Review: Report of the 
Privacy Commissioner 011 the First Periodic Review of the operation of the Privacy Act (Office of 
the Privacy Commissioner, Auckland, 1998) I 08 ["Necessary and Desirable: Privacy Act 1993 
Review: Report of the Privacy Commissioner on the First Periodic Review of the operation of the 
Privacy Act"]. 
66 Ombudsman Act 1975, s 18(2). 
67 Howard Gadlin "The Ombudsman: What's in a Name?" (2000) 16(1) NEJOEQ 37, 42. 
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warranted or not. If the complaint is warranted, the classical ombudsman then makes 
a recommendation for appropriate remedies. However, the classical ombudsman 
contains within it some features of the ADR perspective as well. That is, although the 
classical ombudsman may render a judgment about right and wrong, the classical 
ombudsman lacks the authority to enforce that judgment. 
Howard Gadlin's description fits both the Ombudsman and the Privacy 
Commissioner. An important difference between the two is that the Ombudsman 
has a much wider jurisdiction than than the Privacy Commissioner. The 
Ombudsman's powers are not just restricted to the Official Information Act 1982, 
the Ombudsman has powers to review a wide range of central and local government 
actions. As Philip Joseph states " ... the New Zealand Ombudsmen discharge two 
pnmary roles: as citizens' protector in righting administrative wrongs and in 
promoting open government through access to official information. "68 The 
Ombudsman's decisions cannot be dismissed as easily as the Privacy 
Commissioner's recommendations. The Ombudsman's powers of publicity provide 
a real check on government agencies. The Chief Ombudsman has described the 
powers of Parliamentary Ombudsmen as: 69 
Parliamentary Ombudsmen cannot make determinative or binding decisions after 
completing an investigation. They can only make recommendations. That sets the 
Ombudsman process apart from the normal adversarial process of the Courts who 
are empowered to make binding decisions . The recommendatory capacity of 
Ombudsmen has been extraordinarily effective. It is extremely rare for an 
Ombudsman's recommendation after a full investigation not to be acted upon. 
A 1999 Consumers' Institute survey of consumer complaints bodies gave the 
Ombudsman an "excellent" overall rating, the Privacy Commissioner gained a 
"acceptable" overall rating. 70 The Ombudsman gained "excellent" ratings for 
transparency, independence, coverage and low cost. The Ombudsman received an 
"acceptable" rating for speed and ability to make binding decisions. The Privacy 
Commissioner received "excellent" ratings for transparency, independence, low 
68 Philip A Joseph Co11stitutio11al and Administrative law in New Zealand (2nd ed, Brookers, 
Wellington , 2001) 139. 
69 Joseph, above n 68, 140. 
7° Consumers' Institute, above n I. The Consumers' Institute assessed complaints services on six 
factors: speed, transparency, independence, how binding the decisions are, cost and coverage. 
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cost and coverage. However, the Privacy Commissioner received "poor" ratings 
for speed and the ability to make binding decisions. 
1 Conclusion 
Prior to the enactment of the Privacy Act 1993, both the Official Information 
Act 1982 and the Local Government Official Information and Meetings Act 1987 
provided comprehensive processes for individuals to access and correct personal 
information held by central and local government organisations. The ability to 
enlist the help of the Ombudsman meant that not only did individuals receive 
assistance but also that government officials had to be more open and could be 
more easily held accountable. Requirements for the organisation to raise the matter 
publicly if a recommendation of the Ombudsman would not be followed added 
transparency to the process. The potential to attract the glare of publicity is an 
important control on bureaucratic behaviour. The Southern Institute of Technology 
report is an example of this.71 
The Official Information Act 1982 was a landmark change, in terms of the 
new presumption that personal infornrntion held by central and local government 
should generally be accessible to the individual concerned. The Official 
Information Act 1982 took the dispute resolution model provided in the Wanganui 
Computer Centre Act 1976 and extended it across most of the state sector. Another 
decade was to pass, however, before these concepts around accessibility of personal 
information were applied to the private sector. 
E The Privacy Commissioner Act 1991 
The Privacy Commissioner Act 1991 focused primarily on public sector 
information matching programmes. The Privacy Commissioner Act 1991 defined 
agencies but these were only a select group of government departments reflecting 
the narrow focus of the legislation. The Privacy Commissioner Act 1991 provided 
for the appointment of a Privacy Commissioner, however, there were no powers to 
7 1 " Report of Ombudsman Mel Smith on a Complaint against the Southern Institute of Technology 
by six former students", above n 56. 
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investigate complaints about infringements of privacy. 72 In this sense the Privacy 
Commissioner Act 1991 was similar in scope to the Human Rights Act 1977. For 
the purposes of this paper, the Privacy Commissioner Act 1991 did not represent a 
major advance for individuals seeking to access their personal information. 
III THE PRIVACY ACT 1993 
The Privacy Act 1993 covers both the government and the private sectors. It 
provides statutory standards covering personal information and a dispute resolution 
process to resolve privacy disputes. The coverage of the information privacy 
principles in the Privacy Act 1993 include the collection, retention, use, disclosure 
of and access to personal information. Personal information is widely defined both 
under the Privacy Act 1993 and in practice by the decisions of the Privacy 
Commissioner and the courts. 73 The intent of this paper is to ascertain whether the 
current statutory dispute resolution scheme is the most effective solution or whether 
other dispute resolution options should be available. 
The current legislation is flexible and technologically neutral, that is, the 
Privacy Principles in section 6 are not directed at a particular system or process.74 
The claimed advantage of technological neutrality is that the legislation does not 
need to be continually amended to keep pace with new technological 
advancements. For example, when the Privacy Act 1993 was introduced, few 
people could have foreseen the growth of the internet and with it new challenges for 
privacy, however, the Privacy Principles are flexible and adaptable enough to 
encompass the internet. 
A Scheme of the Privacy Act 1993 
The Privacy Act 1993 represented a significant advance in that it covered 
personal inforn1ation held by both public and private sector agencies. In this sense 
the Privacy Act was broader than the equivalent Australian legislation which only 
72 Privacy Commissioner Act 1991, s 5(3). 
73 See C v ASB Bank (1997) 4 HRNZ 306 (CRT) Bathgate SC. 
74 
"Necessary and Desirable: Privacy Act 1993 Review: Report of the Privacy Commissione r on the 
First Periodic Review of the operation ofthe Privacy Act", above n 65 , 17. 
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covered the public sector. 75 The Official Information Act 1982 and the Local 
Government Official Information and Meetings Act 1987 already covered personal 
information held by local and central government and provided a process to access 
and correct personal information. If the Privacy Act 1993 had covered only the 
public sector most of it would be just duplicating the Official Information Act 1982 
and Local Government Official Infornrntion and Meetings Act 1987. 
B The Privacy Commissioner's Current Powers 
The decisions of the Privacy Commissioner are not binding on the parties in a 
privacy dispute. As the Office of the Privacy Commissioner website states: 76 
The Commissioner can investigate on receipt of a complaint or on her own initiative 
and form an opinion about whether there had been an interference with the privacy 
of an individual. She does not give a decision. Nor does her opinion bind anyone. 
Only the Human Rights Review Tribunal can give a decision which could be 
accurately described as a ruling. 
The Privacy Commissioner can refer the matter to the Director of Human 
Rights Proceedings if the Privacy Commissioner's recommendation is not 
followed. 77 Parties can take privacy related complaints to the Human Rights 
Review Tribunal.78 Decisions of the Human Rights Review Tribunal can be 
appealed to the High Court; a recent example of this is Jans v Winter. 79 
While the appeal process contained in the Privacy Act 1993 does provide 
complainants and respondents with a two-tier appeal system and the potential for a 
day in court, nevertheless, the Privacy Commissioner must first investigate the 
75 Privacy Act 1988 (Cth). 
76 Office of the Privacy Commissioner <http://www.privacy.org.nz/news3.html> (last accessed 21 
August 2004). 
77 Privacy Act 1993, s 77. 
78 Privacy Act 1993 , s 82. 
79 Jans v Winrer (6 April 2004) HC HAM CIV-2003-419-000854 Paterson J . 
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complaint.80 If one or both parties in the dispute are intransigent or antagonistic, 
this process can take well over a year to work through. 81 
The Privacy Commissioner has a range of functions and powers available in 
section 13 of the Privacy Act 1993. A key consideration has to be how to best use 
these powers for the benefit to the greatest number of New Zealanders. The powers 
in section 13 include the ability to examine proposed legislation, provide education 
on privacy matters, review public registers, conduct inquiries on privacy related 
matters and provide advice to agencies on privacy related matters. A recent 
example of the Privacy Commissioner providing advice to an agency is the State 
Services Commission proposal for E Government. The State Services Commission 
are reported as having a budget to pay for the review of the E Government plans by 
the Privacy Commissioner. 82 
C Definitions 
The Privacy Act 1993 is an example of statutory alternative dispute 
resolution, that is, the statute provides a scheme the object of which is to try and 
resolve disputes without recourse to the court system.83 Section 11 (2) of the 
Privacy Act 1993 provides that "the information privacy principles do not confer on 
any person any legal right that is enforcable in a court of law." There is an 
exception to this rule in section 11 ( 1) that access to personal information held by a 
public sector agency is a legal right and one enforcable in court. 84 The Office of 
the Privacy Commissioner employs an investigative model of dispute resolution. 85 
80 
Privacy Act 1993, s 82. 
8 1 Forty four per cent of complaints to the Office of the Privacy Commissioner take longer than six 
months to resolve. See "Report of the Privacy Commissioner for the Year Ended 30 June 2003 ", 
above n 2, 21. 
82 Tom Pullar-Strecker "SSC gets funding for ID project" Dominion Post, Wellington, 31 May 2004 , 
11. 
83 For other examples of statutory dispute resolution see Peter Spiller, Dispute Resolution in New 
Zealand (Oxford University Press, Auckland, 1999) 171. 
84 See "Necessary and Desirable: Privacy Act 1993 Review: Report of the Privacy Commissioner 
on the First Periodic Review of the operation of the Privacy Act", above n 65, 107. 
85 See New Zealand Law Commission Delivering Justice for All: a Vision for New Zealand Courts 
and Tribunals (NZLC R85, Wellington , 2004) 291 ["Delivering Justice for All: a Vision for New 
Zealand Courts and Tribunals"). 
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An investigative model of dispute resolution differs from other forms of 
alternative dispute resolution such as mediation and arbitration in a number of 
ways. 86 Mediation and arbitration principally involve the disputing parties meeting 
together in a manner that is faciliated to varying degrees in order to work through 
their differences.87 An investigative model of dispute resolution, such as that 
practised by the Office of the Privacy Commissioner, does not require the parties to 
meet each other. Indeed, the parties do not even have to meet the investigator. My 
experience of the process adopted by the Office of the Privacy Commissioner is 
that investigations are generally done "off the papers".88 For the purposes of this 
paper, an "off the papers" approach to investigation is a model where the 
investigator does not meet the parties to the dispute or bring the parties together in a 
physical sense. The Privacy Commissioner's staff work through the material 
provided by the parties, asking questions to clarify points or to elicit further 
information. 89 Conducting most investigations in an "off the papers" manner 
presumably has the benefit of being efficient in terms of staff time. In contrast, a 
process that required the Privacy Commissioner or their staff to meet with the 
parties to every complaint would be resource intensive, expensive in terms of travel 
and time consuming. 
The downside of an "off the papers" approach to conducting investigations is 
that investigations can become drawn out over a long period of time. The effect of 
this is that the complainant does not get prompt access to their personal information 
and tensions can rise as the parties become more frustrated with the delays. Once 
the initial contact is made by the complainant, either by telephone or in writing, 
further questions are likely to arise.90 Engaging in rounds of correspondence with 
the inevitable pauses in the investigation as the parties reply to the questions raised 
86 Another statutory example of a body that uses an investigative model of dispute resolution is the 
Employment Relations Authority. See Employment Relations Act 2000 s 157( I) . 
87 See Spiller, above n 833, 57 and 93. 
88 Other methods are occasionally used, the Privacy Commissioner arranged for two mediations in 
the 2002/2003 year. See "Report of the Privacy Commissioner for the Year Ended 30 June 2003", 
above n 2, 22. 
89 A useful example of the Office of the Privacy Commissioner asking further questions is contained 
in Gaeline Phipps "Privacy Act: two complaints dissected" (5 November 2003) Doctor ew 
Zealand 19. 
9° For the statistics of the number of enquiries received by the Office of the Privacy Commissioner 
from 1998 to 2003 see "Report of the Privacy Commissioner for the Year Ended 30 June 2003", 
above n 2, 35. 
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all takes time. 91 The Office of the Privacy Commissioner has a performance 
standard that correspondence will be answered within 20 working days. 92 Even if 
this performance standard is somewhat exceeded, delays still occur. The Privacy 
Commissioner does have the power to compel the disputing parties to attend a 
conference, however, this does not appear to be used often.93 The issue then 
becomes how quickly the complainant or agency responds to requests for 
clarification. Agencies have 20 working days to respond to requests from the 
Privacy Commissioner.94 The "off the papers" model of dealing with complaints 
can be contrasted with a dispute resolution model such as mediation where the 
parties and the mediator meet together and work through the issues in "real time". 
In a mediation, with the parties sitting across the table from each other there is a 
strong likelihood that if an issue is raised the other party can promptly respond. My 
experience with the Office of the Privacy Commissioner has been that complainants 
will respond to issues through the investigating officer who in tum will respond to 
the agency in writing. Even with the best intentions, there is naturally some degree 
of delay in this chain of correspondence as an investigating officer does not have 
the luxury of working on one complaint at a time and so, presumably, must juggle 
their work. In 1997, every investigation officer had an average of 120 complaints 
each.95 
The Privacy Commissioner cannot order or enforce settlements between 
parties to a privacy complaint. Enforcement powers under the Privacy Act 1993 are 
held only by the Human Rights Review Tribunal.96 Once a complaint has been 
investigated by the Office of the Privacy Commissioner, one or both of the parties 
to a complaint can apply to have the Human Rights Review Tribunal hear the 
complaint. The Privacy Commissioner has the descretionary power to refer a 
9 1 There is a statutory requirement in s 92 of the Privacy Act 1993 that an agency provides the 
Privacy Commissioner with any information or document requested within 20 working days . 
92 
"Report of the Privacy Commissioner for the Year Ended 30 June 2003", above n 2, 138. 
93 Statistics were sought from the Privacy Commissioner, a response was not received by I O October 
2004: Marie Shroff, Privacy Commissioner, from the author ( 17 August 2004) facsimile letter. 
94 Privacy Act 1993 , s 92(2). 
95 "Necessary and Desirable: Privacy Act 1993 Review: Report of the Privacy Commissioner on the 
First Periodic Review of the operation of the Privacy Act", above n 65 , 4 I 9. 
96 An example ofa case where the Privacy Commissioner could not resolve a complaint and referred 
the matter to the Proceedings Commissioner is Proceedings Commissioner v Health Waikato (2000) 
6 HRNZ 274, 280 (HC) Smellie J. 
complaint to the Director of Human Rights Proceedings if the Privacy 
Commissioner believes that the complaint has substance. 
D The Investigation Process -An Agency Perspective 
When the Office of the Privacy Commissioner receives a complaint about an 
agency, it contacts the agency and advises the agency of the complaint. My 
experience is that where the Office of the Privacy Commissioner is aware of the 
name of the agency's privacy officer, it will contact that person directly. The 
agency is asked by the Office of the Privacy Commissioner to outline their 
perspective in realtion to the complaint. From the agency's perspective, this can 
involve considerable effort on the part of the Privacy Officer. In a large 
organisation, the privacy officer may not be aware of the background to the 
complaint before hearing from the Office of the Privacy Commissioner. The effect 
of this is the privacy officer has to determine who in the agency dealt with the 
complainant, contact the people concerned and collect the documentation involved. 
This information should allow the privacy officer to make an initial judgment on 
the veracity of the complaint. If the complaint is that documents have not been 
released, the privacy officer will need to review the documents to detern1ine 
whether the documents should be released to the complainant. If the documents or 
parts of the documents are to be withheld, the privacy officer has to determine the 
grounds under the Privacy Act 1993 that allows the agency to legally withhold the 
information. The privacy officer has to exercise great care to ensure that in 
releasing information to a complainant, information about other individuals is not 
inadvertantly released. This can be difficult where a document refers to two 
individuals and only one individual is seeking the information. The privacy officer 
also has to ensure that trade secrets belonging to the agency are not released whilst 
meeting the requirements of the Privacy Act 1993.97 Section 115 of the Privacy 
Act 1993 provides protection to those who make information available in good faith 
following a request under information privacy principle 6.98 This is a valuable 
protection for agencies. 
97 Privacy Act 1993, s 28. 
98 See !lich v Accident Rehabilitation a11d Co111pe11satio11 Corporatio11 [2000] I NZLR 380, 383 
(HC) Tompkins J. 
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In summary, my experience is that agencies get frustrated by the delays in the 
current disputes process. Complaints can stretch out over a long period of time and 
neither party is bound by the outcome of the investigation. Where a complaint 
takes a long time to resolve, there is the risk that staff may leave the agency in the 
intervening period making it more difficult to resolve the complaint. A dispute 
process where the complaint is quickly dealt with and the result is binding on the 
parties means would be more efficient. 
E Assessing the Value of an Investigative Process 
The current investigative model has a number of benefits for resolving 
privacy disputes. A "one stop shop" where the Office of the Privacy Commissioner 
specialises in privacy matters and has a near monopoly on dealing with disputes 
under the Privacy Act 1993 should make it easier to develop a consistent approach 
to privacy disputes. Stability through a consistent approach to resolving disputes 
has developed during the decade long tenure of Bruce Slane as Privacy 
Commissioner. 99 
An investigative model provides the ability to take an in-depth and considered 
approach to dispute resolution because the Privacy Commissioner has a 20 working 
day period to respond, so there are no tight time constraints. There is not a 
timetable for hearings to be scheduled into, as opposed to, say, Disputes Tribunals 
where there are a number of hearings scheduled each day. 100 In depth reviews of 
disputes has the most benefit with complaints involving the disclosure of personal 
information or the collection of personal information arising under Infomrntion 
Privacy Principles 11 and 3 respectively. The ability to canvass in detail the issues 
in a disclosure complaint has the benefit of being able to assess the harm caused to 
the complainant. This investigation can also build up a detailed picture of why an 
agency was collecting personal information and what the personal infonnation was 
to be used for. This is important as the scheme of the Privacy Act 1993 requires 
99"Report of the Privacy Commissioner for the Year Ended 30 June 2003", above n 2, 8. 
100 Peter Spiller The Disputes Tribunals of New Zealand (Brookers, Wellington, 1997) 67 ["The 
Disputes Tribunals of New Zealand"]. 
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that not only does one of the Information Privacy Principles have to be breached 
but that there is an interference with privacy in terms of section 66 for complaints 
other than those arising from access to and correction of personal information 
requests. Section 66(2) provides that there is an interference with privacy if an 
agency refuses to make information available. 101 The Privacy Commissioner has 
stated: 102 
I am confident that section 66(2) was intended to ensure that substantiated access 
complaints could be considered an "interference with privacy" without any harm or 
detriment of the type referred to in section 66(l)(b) so long as the various criteria in 
section 66(2)(a) and (b) are present. However, if there was some harm or detriment, 
a breach of principle 6 could alternatively be brought under section 66( I). 
It is extremely important to ensure that there are enforcable remedies for the access 
entitlements in principle 6 without any proof of harm or detriment. Quite frequently, 
such harm or detriment will be absent. 
For the purposes of this paper, the distinction in section 66 is important. 
Essentially, section 66 catagorises disputes arising from the information privacy 
principles into two groups, arguably, one group where an investigation is required 
to determine if there has been an interference with privacy. The second group has 
an inference that if an agency refuses to grant a request there is an interference with 
privacy. Therefore, the scheme of section 66 means that access requests are easier 
to deal with in a short hearing process because there is not the requirement for a 
detailed investigation as to whether the agency's conduct amounts to an 
interference. The scheme of section 66 also provides a basis to distinguish 
between access personal information complaints and other types of complaint. 
In terms of an access to personal information complaint under info1mation 
privacy principle 6, an interference with privacy is more likely to be exacerbated if 
there are significant delays in the dispute resolution process. The snowballing 
effect of delays in access disputes is a key reason to provide additional avenues to 
resolve access disputes quickly. 
101 Privacy Act 1993, s 66(2)(a)(i). 
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The next point to be considered is whether there is an inherent value in an 
investigative process for the parties. The "off the papers" model of investigative 
dispute resolution as practised by the Office of the Privacy Commissioner means 
that generally there are no face-to-face meetings between the parties. This 
approach may take the heat out of the situation. The downside is that the parties do 
not get to look each other in the eye and there is the potential for ongoing tension to 
grow with successive rounds of correspondence and the inevitable time delays that 
this brings . 
While an in-depth investigation may benefit the parties to a complaint, the 
question that has to be asked is: what benefit does the wider community get from 
the in depth review of one complaint? If the decision was novel or likely to affect a 
number of people, say a complaint about a government department such as Work 
and Income, where the agency concerned can change their processes as a result of 
an investigation by the Privacy Commissioner, then there is some wider benefit. 
An investigation by the Privacy Commissioner can have an educational function if 
there is a systemic problem at an agency. An alternative point of view is that an 
agency may change their processes just with some bad publicity arising from an 
error. A recent example of this was the error made by Work and Income in 
disclosing personal information of beneficiaries in a curriculum vitae writing 
scheme. '03 
A less adversarial approach to dispute resolution like an investigative model 
has advantages where there is an ongoing relationship between the parties. In a 
situation like an employment relationship, where reinstatement may be an option, it 
is important to try and preserve the relationship as far as possible and to design the 
dispute resolution process accordingly. 104 The questions that this raises in the 
context of privacy disputes are; do the parties care about the relationship and, if so, 
102 "Necessary and Desirable: Privacy Act 1993 Review : Report of the Pri vacy Commissioner on 
the First Periodic Review of the operation of the Privacy Act", above n 65 , 270. 
103 Leanne Bell "Beneficiaries Upset by Privacy Breaches" (26 May 2004) Do111i11io11 Post 
Wellington A4. 
104 See Employment Relations Act 2000, s 143. 
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is an investigative model going to preserve the relationship? The importance of 
preserving the relationship will depend on the context. If the relationship is a 
commercial one, say with a doctor or a chemist, then if other providers are 
available, the complainant can use them. My experience of complaints brought 
under the Privacy Act 1993, in a commercial environment where the complainant 
has a choice of providers for a particular service, is that often the relationship 
between the parties had already soured to a point where the choice of dispute 
resolution mechanism was not likely to matter or would not improve or rebuild the 
relationship. The Privacy Commissioner gave an indication of this in Necessary 
and Desirable "Many people aggrieved at some action, or lack of action, about a 
matter concerning them, obtain a real satisfaction from being able to access relevant 
information. " 105 In dealing with an aggrieved complainant, it is a case of 
expediting the disputes process so the parties can go on their separate ways. 
Where a privacy complaint involves a statutory monopoly where there is no 
choice but to deal with that organisation, such as ACC, that body is likely to 
already have internal systems to manage the process and to ensure people are dealt 
with fairly . 106 In any case, issues concerning the maintenance of relationships 
between government agencies and citizens after disputes have arisen are not 
confined to privacy related disputes. 
An investigative process to resolve disputes provides an in depth 
investigation of the dispute. Where appropriate, the in depth review of a complaint 
can have positive outcomes for the agency in terms of improved processes. An 
investigative process suited to an "off the papers" mode of operating. It would 
depend on the particular circumstances of a complaint whether the investigative 
process would maintain the relationship between the parties. The current delays in 
resolving disputes in the Office of the Privacy Commissioner are likely to negate 
any benefit that the investigative process can bring to preserving the relationship 
between the parties. 
105 
"Necessary and Desirable: Privacy Act 1993 Review: Report of the Privacy Commissioner on 
the First Periodic Review of the operation of the Privacy Act", above n 65 , 75 . 
106 For example the Injury Prevention , Rehabilitation and Compensation (Code of ACC Claimants ' 
Rights) Notice 2002. 
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F The Human Rights Review Tribunal 
Recommendations of the Privacy Commissioner are not binding on the 
parties to a dispute so either party can take the matter to the Human Rights Review 
Tribunal (HRRT). 107 Less than five per cent of cases considered by the Privacy 
Commissioner are taken to the HRRT. 108 The HRRT was formerly known as the 
Complaints Review Tribunal and is established under the Human Rights Act 1993. 
The name changed on 1 January 2002 under the Human Rights Amendment Act 
2001. The HRR T also hears complaints under the Human Rights Act 1993 and the 
Health and Disability Commissioner Act 1994. The HRRT is the second stage for 
human rights complaints. Complaints under the Human Rights Act 1993 have to 
first be considered by the Human Rights Commission. 109 This makes the process a 
mirror of the process for complaints under the Privacy Act 1993 . 
1 The HRRT Process 
The HRRT has a range of judicial powers, there is a power to summons, 110 
ignoring a summons from the HRRT is an offence. 111 The HRRT's powers under 
the Privacy Act 1993 are set out in section 85 of the Privacy Act 1993 . The HRRT 
is also more flexible than the courts in how proceedings are conducted.112 The 
basis of decision making in the HRRT is set out in section 105 of the Human Rights 
Act 1993. This section states: 
I 05 Substantial Merits 
1) The Tribunal must act according to the substantial merits of the case, w ithout 
regard to technicalities 
107 Privacy Act 1993 , s 77. 
108 " Report of the Privacy Commissioner for the Year Ended 30 June 2003", above n 2, 21 . 
109 Human Rights Commission Fact Sheet 2: Process f or Dealing with Disputes. Copies of thi s are 
available on line at the Human Rights Commission website 
<http ://www.hrc.co.nzJindex.php?p= 13855> (last accessed 21 August 2004). 
11 0 Human Rights Act I 993, s 109. 
111 Human Rights Act 1993, s 113. 
11 2 Human Rights Act 1993, s I 04. 
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2) In exercising its powers and functions, the Tribunal must act 
a) in accordance with the principles of natural justice; and 
in a manner that is fair and reasonable; and 
according to equity and good conscience. 
This flexible approach to decision making in the HRRT is carried across to 
evidential requirements. The HRRT is not bound by strict rules of evidence. 113 In 
this respect the HRRT has similar rules of evidence to Disputes Tribunals. 114 
If the Privacy Commissioner cannot settle a dispute and believes that the 
complainant's case has merit, the Privacy Commissioner can refer the dispute to the 
Director of Human Rights Proceedings. 115 In the 2002/2003 year five referrals 
were made by the Privacy Commissioner. 116 The Privacy Commissioner stated: 117 
My decision on whether to exercise my discretion to refer a matter will take account 
ofa number of factors , both general and specific. Where I choose not to refer to the 
Director [of Human Rights Proceedings] a complaint following investigation , this 
should not be interpreted as indicating that the complaint is unmeritorious. If, for 
instance, I consider that a complainant has refused to accept a reasonable offer of 
settlement I might leave it for the complainant to bring a case to determine the 
appropriate remedy. 
If the Privacy Commissioner does not refer a complaint to the Director of 
Human Rights Proceedings, the complainant has the right to take their complaint to 
the HRRT. The complainant's right to take their complaint to the HRRT is 
available irrespective of whether the Privacy Commissioner believes the complaint 
has substance. 118 
If one party 1s so minded as to ignore the decision of the Privacy 
Commissioner, the party seeking to enforce the decision, invariably the 
113 Human Rights Act 1993, s I 06. 
114 Disputes Tribunals Act 1988, s 40. 
115 "Report of the Privacy Commissioner for the Year Ended 30 June 2003", above n 2, 29. 
11 6 Human Rights Commission Report of the Human Rights Commission and The Office of Human 
Rights Proceedings for the Year Ended 30 June 2003 (E6, Wellington, 2003) 19. 
117 "Report of the Privacy Commissioner for the Year Ended 30 June 2003", above n 2, 29 . 
11 8 "Report of the Privacy Commissioner for the Year Ended 30 June 2003 " , above n 2, 29 . 
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complainant, has to go to the effort of taking the complaint to the HRRT. This 
incurs costs to both the parties to the complaint and costs to the taxpayer in running 
an HRRT hearing. The Director of Human Rights Proceedings can take matters to 
the HRRT on behalf of the complainant without cost to the complainant if the 
complaint is assessed as having merit. Although if the Director of Human Rights 
Proceedings takes the complaint to the HRRT any costs are borne by the Office of 
h P . C . . 119 t e nvacy omm1ss10ner. In this respect the Director of Human Rights 
Proceedings provides a worthwhile independent check of the merits of a particular 
complaint before more taxpayers money is spent taking the matter to the HRRT. 
2 Difficulties in the HRRT 
In recent years there was a problem with only a few cases getting accepted by 
the HRRT. In 2001 and 2002, the National Business Review reported that many 
privacy complaints taken to the Complaints Review Tribunal, as the HRRT was 
then known, were struck out on the basis that the complaint had no chance of 
succeeding, this approach was widely criticised. 120 These complaints were struck 
out without a hearing. The effect being that the complainants concerned were 
denied entry to a dispute resolution system that provided an enforceable remedy. 
Of the 21 privacy related complaints taken to the Complaints Review Tribunal 
between January 2000 and June 2001 , 15 were struck out. 121 In nearly all the cases 
struck out, the complainants did not have counsel to represent them. 122 
The Office of the Privacy Commissioner's publication Complaints Review 
Tribunal Privacy Cases 1998 - 2001, 123 records that of the 48 cases taken by 
complainants to the Complaints Review Tribunal during the period covered, 25 
cases had either part or all or their cases struck out without a hearing. Of the cases 
11 9 Privacy Act 1993, s 86( 4). 
120 Jock Anderson "Triple dipper ' s "moonlighting" bill revealed" National Business Review, 7 
September 2001 , 3 and Jock Anderson "Slane slams Bathgate' s troubled tribunal" Nation al Business 
Revi ew, 18 January 2002, 2. 
121
Jock Anderson "Triple dipper's "moonlighting" bill revealed" National Business Review, 7 
September 2001 , 3. 
122 
Jock Anderson "Slane slams Bathgate ' s troubled tribunal " National Business Review, 18 Janu ary 
2002, 2. 
123 
Office of the Privacy Commissioner Complaints Review Tribunal Privacy Cases 1998 - 2001 
(Office of the Privacy Commissioner, 2001 ). 
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heard by the Complaints Review Tribunal, only five complainants were legally 
represented compared to 17 of the respondents. The representation figures show an 
imbalance. However, when consideration is given to the fact that 73 per cent of the 
respondents were large Government departments, 124 it is not surprising that 
respondents generally have legal representation. Had the complainants' concerned 
had legal representation, they may have been advised that their cases were unlikely 
to succeed and so not have gone to the HRRT. 
The HRRT has now amended its approach to privacy related complaints. As 
the Report of the Privacy Commissioner for the Year Ended 30 June 2003 notes: 12 5 
While the numbers of proceedings being initiated by the aggrieved individual in the 
[Human Rights Review] Tribunal remains constant (averaging around 24 per year in 
the last three years) the issues raised are now dealt with through full hearings (in 
contrast to the Tribunal's previous practice. Jn some cases this is in addition to 
detailed work at the pre-hearing stage. 
As the Privacy Act 1993 currently stands, it is important for the HRR T to 
allow cases to be heard given that the Privacy Commissioner's powers are limited 
to making a recommendation. If a complainant is not given a hearing, the 
complainant is reliant on the goodwill or the good citizenship of the agency to 
provide access to personal information. The downside of the HRRT hearing every 
complaint is that complaints which have little basis or merit are heard . This incurs 
costs for both the agency in attending and the taxpayer in running an HRRT 
hearing. Both parties to a complaint need a reasonably affordable path to an 
enforceable result. 
124
"Report of the Privacy Commissioner for the Year Ended 30 June 2003", above n 2, 28 . 
125"Report of the Privacy Commissioner for the Year Ended 30 June 2003", above n 2, 29 . 
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G Promotion of the Privacy Act 1993 
Part of an effective disputes resolution scheme is ensuring people are aware 
of the scheme, how it operates and the range of possible outcomes. The Office of 
the Privacy Commissioner currently promotes privacy issues in a number of ways. 
Private Word, a regular newsletter is distributed with archive copies available on 
the Office of the Privacy Commissioner's website. 126 Notes of selected cases and 
fact sheets are also issued. 
A gap in the promotional information provided by the Privacy Commissioner 
is the lack of a small leaflet for distribution to organisations such as Community 
Law Centres, Citizens Advice Bureaux and public libraries. I visited the 
Wellington Citizens Advice Bureau and the Wellington Community Law Centre 
and was unable to obtain from either organisation a leaflet setting out the functions 
of the Office of the Privacy Commissioner. 127 Both organisations held copies of 
various fact sheets issued by the Privacy Commissioner for use by their staff. 
However, the fact sheets are reasonably detailed, this may make them too difficult 
to read and therefore inaccessible to some people. Furthermore, the copies of the 
fact sheets were for the use of the staff of the organisations rather than for 
distribution to the public. The effect of not having a leaflet on display are twofold, 
a casual visitor might gain the impression that a remedy for their problem is not 
available and simply leave or, secondly, have to seek an appointment with a staff 
member which might be inconvenient. 
Given the wide coverage of the Privacy Act 1993, it may not just be 
individuals seeking information about how the Privacy Act 1993 operates . 
Agencies may find a succinct guide useful for training or reference purposes. 
It was interesting to note that both the Wellington Citizens' Advice Bureau 
and the Wellington Community Law Centre both held copies of leaflets issued by 
126 Private Word was published four times in the 2002/2003 year. See "Report of the Privacy 
Commissioner for the Year Ended 30 June 2003", above n 2, 140. 
127 Visits by author 7 September 2004. See also "Report of the Privacy Commissioner for the Year 
Ended 30 June 2003", above n 2, 140. 
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the Electricity Complaints Commission on its dispute process and leaflets on filing 
cases in Disputes Tribunals. 
While the Office of the Privacy Commissioner has a detailed website, the risk 
of relying on a website to distribute information means that those who do not have 
internet access cannot obtain the information. A small leaflet providing a precis of 
the Privacy Commissioner's functions, a diagram of the disputes process and 
contact details would be very useful. Advocacy groups could have the leaflet 
available to answer enquiries and responsible agencies could even send copies of 
the leaflet out to individuals that present with privacy queries. All in all , a readily 
available, easily understood leaflet would be of real benefit to all concerned. 
IV ACCESSING PERSONAL INFORMATION: THE CURRENT 
SITUATION 
The current situation m New Zealand for obtaining access to personal 
information can be divided into two main categories, the Privacy Act 1993 and the 
court system. 128 I have already discussed the Privacy Act 1993, so this section is 
focussed on the court system. 
A The Court System 
The second category for obtaining personal inforn1ation is by using the cour1 
system. 129 The following discussion is written on the basis that the plaintiff has a 
cause of action to file a case. The High Com1 in Johansen v American 
Underwriters (NZ) Limited'30 held that the discovery process and the Privacy Act 
1993 can coexist. 131 In a civil case, the parties need to have the information that 
128 There are other methods for accessing information such as those already discussed in the Offici a l 
Information Act I 982 and the Local Government Official Information and Meetings Act I 987 . For 
the sake of brevity, this paper does not review other individual statutes that provide access to 
information in particular areas. 
129 For a general discussion on litigation as a means of dispute resolution see Peter Spiller (ed) 
Dispute Resolution in New Zealand (Oxford University Press, Auckland, 1999) 131 . 
130 Johansen v American Underwriters (NZ) limited [ 1997] 3 NZLR 765 (HC) Master Kenned y-
Grant. 
131 See Paul Roth (ed), Privacy Law and Practice (loose leaf, LexisNexus New Zealand Limited , 
Wellington, 2003) para 1006.32AA (last updated 25 May 2000). 
32 
pertains to their case in order to make their arguments as strong as possible. In the 
New Zealand court system, once a case has been filed in either the District Court or 
the High Court, the discovery process takes place. The discovery process is 
governed by the rules of the applicable court. 
The discovery process is intended to allow the parties to a case to obtain all 
the documents that may be relevant to their case from the other parties .132 The 
documents can include documents containing personal information. Each party 
assembles the relevant documents that they hold, lists the documents, and then 
allows the other parties to review their documents - a process known as 
inspection. 133 Documents are widely defined and include electronic material. 134 
Each party must swear an affidavit stating that all the relevant documents they hold 
are listed. 135 
For documents to be excluded from the inspection process they have to attract 
legal privilege. There are established classes of documents that can be classed as 
privileged. These include correspondence from a person to their lawyer and without 
prejudice communication. 136 The point to note here is that legal privilege provides 
for only narrow exceptions to providing documents to the other party in contrast to 
the range of exceptions contained in the Official Information Act 1982 137 and the 
Privacy Act 1993.138 
If one of the parties in a case is not happy with the extent of the documents 
discovered by the other party, the court rules allow the party to apply for court 
orders for further and better discovery 139 or for a judge to make a ruling on whether 
a particular document attracts privilege. 140 
132See Compagnie Financiere et Co111111erciale du Pacifique v Peruvian Guano Co ( 1882) 11 QBD 
55 (QB). 
133 See Andrew Beck Principles of Civil Procedure (Brookers, Wellington, 200 I) 2 I 6. 
134 Derby & Co Ltd v Weldon (No 9) [ I 991] 1 WLR 652 (Chancery Division). 
135 Hi gh Court Rule 303(1); District Court Rules 325(1). 
136 See Beck, above n 133, 223. 
137 Conclusive reasons for withholding official information are set out in Official Information Act 
1982, s 6. 
138 Privacy Act 1993, Part 4. 
139 The power is set out in High Court Rule 297 and District Court Rule 3 I 9. 
140 High Court Rule 311(1) and District Court Rule 333(1). 
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Once the discovery and inspection process is complete, the parties form the 
agreed bundle; these are the documents that will be referred to in the hearing. 141 An 
agreed bundle should support your case and include any documents that are referred 
to in evidence by either the lawyer or witnesses. 
The fundamental differences between the discovery process in the court 
system and the Official Information Act 1982 is that discovery is applicable to both 
government and private sector information. The discovery process differs from the 
Privacy Act 1993 in that discovery is not just limited to obtaining personal 
information. Discovery is therefore a stronger tool for obtaining information, both 
personal and otherwise, than the Privacy Act 1993 or the Official Information Act 
1982. 
The fundamental problem with the discovery process is cost. Court fees in 
the District Court and High Court are substantial. 142 In addition, most people 
seeking to take a case to court will want to hire a lawyer to represent them. Unless 
the person is eligible for legal aid or is wealthy, the cost of taking a case to court is 
likely to deter most people. The effect of this is, while the discovery process in 
itself is an effective tool for accessing personal information, in reality because of 
cost the discovery option is unlikely to be used and cheaper options are required. 
V A STREAMED APPROACH TO PRIVACY COMPLAINTS 
The next part of this paper will take the dispute processes from the Privacy 
Act 1993 and the court system outlined above and consider whether they can be 
mixed together to build a better dispute resolution scheme for dealing with personal 
information. 
141 See Beck, above n 133 , 232. 
142See District Courts Fees Regulations 2001 and High Courts Fees Regulations 2001. 
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The option to be explored is a streamed scheme for access to information 
complaints. One stream would be the existing Privacy Commissioner investigative 
model scheme. The second stream would use a court or tribunal, either the Human 
Rights Review Tribunal, Disputes Tribunals or District Courts. The proposal is for 
complainants to have the option to use a court or tribunal where they are seeking 
access to or the release of a document - the complainant could obtain an order for 
the document to be released. 
A Advantages of Hearings 
The mam reason for providing a court or tribunal based scheme, as an 
alternative option for complainants is speed. If Disputes Tribunals were used as the 
forum for hearing privacy disputes, 80 per cent of complainants could have their 
case heard in approximately 90 days. 143 The Wellington District Court hears civil 
interlocutory applications on the first Friday of every month. 144 These options are 
potentially much faster than the hearing time through the Office of the Privacy 
Commissioner. The Office of the Privacy Commissioner reports that in the 
2002/2003 year, 15 per cent of complaints were closed within three months of 
receipt and another 41 per cent were closed within six months of receipt. 145 There 
is the potential for further delays if one of the parties to the dispute does not accept 
the Privacy Commissioner's recommendation following the investigation. As 
already set out, the Privacy Commissioner does not have the power to order a party 
to act; this power is reserved for the HRRT. 
Providing an adversarial option for resolving privacy disputes recognises that 
one or both parties to a privacy dispute may not want to work constructively 
together to resolve the issue. There may be an inequality of bargaining strength 
that means one party is prepared to ignore the other party's rights. The agency 
involved may not be a good corporate citizen or be unconcerned about any negative 
143 See Department for Courts A1111ual Report for the year e11di11g 30 Ju11e 2003 (E 60, Wellington , 
2003) 50. 
144 Advice from Wellington District Court Registry to author 21 September 2004. 
145"Report of the Privacy Commissioner for the Year Ended 30 June 2003", above n 2, 21. 
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publicity that could arise from the complaint. There is also often not a commercial 
imperative on one party to resolve, or resolve promptly, an access to personal 
information issue. Arguably, where a complainant is using the Privacy Act 1993 as 
a tool for an information fishing exercise, perhaps to see if it is worthwhile filing a 
claim against the agency concerned, there is potentially quite the opposite 
incentive. 146 The current two-step system using the Privacy Commissioner and 
then the HRRT can be seen as recognising there are situations where the parties to a 
dispute will need an adversarial system with a result that can be enforced to settle a 
dispute. The problem with the current system is that while the HRRT can provide 
finality, there are considerable delays in getting to that point. 
While the Office of the Privacy Commissioner is placing greater emphasis on 
mediation to resolving disputes promptly rather than going through a drawn out 
investigation. 147 The type of mediation practised is not conventional mediation 
where the parties meet, more a paper based mediation, 148 this is potentially fraught 
with difficulty because those involved may not be able to clearly communicate in 
writing or over the telephone. Further, mediation is heavily reliant on both parties 
having the will to cooperate. In any case, where the parties have the will to resolve 
a dispute they will need the minimum of assistance: many privacy disputes may 
well be resolved without the involvement of the Office of the Privacy 
Commissioner because the parties involved have the will to solve the problem. 
However, a dispute resolution system should not be designed on the basis that those 
who use it will want to work constructively together, the system needs to have 
some power. 
B Which courts or tribunals would hear privacy matters? 
The first question to be decided if privacy matters are to be dealt with in a 
court or tribunal is: which court or tribunal should hear them? The logical courts to 
consider for this purpose are the Human Rights Review Tribunal, Disputes 
Tribunals and District Courts. 
146"Report of the Privacy Commissioner for the Year Ended 30 June 2003", above 11 2, 23. 
147"Repor1 of the Privacy Commissioner for the Year Ended 30 June 2003 ", above 11 2, 21 . 
148 See Spi ller, above n 833, 57. 
36 
C Human Rights Review Tribunal 
An option worth considering for the resolution of privacy complaints is to 
amend the structure of the Human Rights Review Tribunal (HRRT) to allow 
complainants to bring an action directly in the HRRT without having to first go 
through the Office of the Privacy Commissioner. This would require amending 
section 82 of the Privacy Act 1993. 
The HRRT has a schedule of hearings that is demand driven. The HRRT 
travels to hear complaints and hearings are held near to where the complainant 
lives. Currently there is a four-month wait for an HRRT hearing. 149 
The HRRT sits in District Court facilities, though unlike District Courts does 
not have a permanent presence at each location. The issue with this is if the HRR T 
was to be used to hold hearings for access to information requests the process might 
be slower than if District Courts were used. The advantage of the District Court is 
that a complainant can visit the District Court and obtain an interlocutory 
application as opposed to waiting for the HRRT to come to town. There is little 
point in having a two-stream approach for access complaints using the Privacy 
Commissioner and direct recourse to the HRRT if someone in Oamaru has to wait 
months for the HRRT to come to town. This negates the convenience of the 
supposedly faster option. Consideration also should be given to the cost of moving 
the HRRT around New Zealand. It must be expensive for the taxpayer for the 
HRRT to travel to Gore, for example, just to hear one complaint. It is better from a 
cost perspective to use the existing District Court system. 
As noted, the HRRT hears complaints arising under three statutes, the Human 
Rights Act 1993, the Privacy Act 1993 and the Health and Disability Commissioner 
Act 1994. All three statutes require the complainant to first go through a statutory 
body like the Privacy Commissioner. Careful consideration would need to be given 
to the amount of extra administration expenses that would be incurred in allowing 
the HRRT to hear access complaints directly. An exception for privacy access 
149 Chris Smith, Ministry of Justice, to the author ( 16 August 2004) letter. 
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complaints may cause problems for the other types of disputes the HRRT hears, 
there may be delays due to the HRRT being swamped by privacy complaints. 
There are several positive aspects if direct entry to the HRRT for access to 
personal information complaints is allowed. The HRRT is experienced in privacy 
related issues as it handles privacy matters at present. The HRRT is free for users, 
this helps avoid deterring would be users because of cost. 150
 The disadvantages of 
using the HRRT are that there are already delays of four months in obtaining a 
hearing. Unless further funding was provided to the HRRT, these delays may grow 
if more work was to come from privacy matters. Also, the HRRT does not have a 
permanent presence around New Zealand, meaning that would be users would have 
to wait until the HRRT came to town. 
The effect of these issues is that the HRRT in its present form is not flexible 
enough to provide prompt resolution for access to personal information disputes. 
This out weighs the benefit of the HRRT's specialist knowledge. Disputes 
Tribunals or District Courts may provide more flexibility; these options will now be 
assessed. 
D Disputes Tribunals 
Disputes Tribunals were originally established as Small Claims Tribunals in 
the l 970's to hear and resolve disputes of low monetary value that would otherwise 
b · · h · 151 e uneconomic to pursue m t e mam court system. Disputes Tribunals use 
District Court facilities, so they have a wide geographic presence, so many New 
Zealanders would have a Disputes Tribunal nearby. This wide presence is in 
contrast to the HRRT that has to travel for each hearing. Disputes Tribunals also 
hear complaints quickly; this has the benefit of reducing costs in terms of time and 
lost opportunities. Based on Department of Courts statistics and assuming the 
150 See Office of the Privacy Commissioner "Submission on review of Civil Court Fees: Stage Two -
Human Rights Review Tribunal" (17 June 2003) I ["Submission on review of Civil Court Fees: 
Stage Two - Human Rights Review Tribunal"]. 
151 "The Disputes Tribunals of New Zealand", above n 100, 5. 
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performance of Disputes Tribunals and the HRRT remam constant, if Disputes 
Tribunals were to hear privacy complaints over 80 per cent of claims would be 
heard in three months before the HRRT could start hearing complaints because of 
the HRRT's four month waiting period. 152 
Allowing Disputes Tribunals to hear privacy disputes would be a significant 
expansion of their jurisdiction. The jurisdiction of Disputes Tribunals is set by the 
Disputes Tribunals Act 1988 and is limited to contract and quasi contract, tort and 
statutory causes 153 of action such as under the Fencing Act 1978. As Peter Spiller 
states "[t ]hese restrictions reflect the intention that the [Disputes] Tribunal's 
jurisdiction be limited to essentially factual matters not requiring complex and 
technical legal knowledge." 154 
An issue to address if Dispute Tribunals were to start hearing privacy matters 
1s: do the existing referees have the requisite expertise? 155 Privacy related matters 
would be a departure from the current jurisdiction that is generally contract and tort 
based. While there is a growing tort of privacy in New Zealand, Disputes Tribunals 
can consider only a restricted range of torts, 156 this means that currently Disputes 
Tribunals cannot currently consider cases brought under the tort of privacy. The 
effect of these factors is that currently Disputes Tribunal referees are unlikely to 
have practical experience in dealing with privacy related issues or current expertise 
in privacy matters. 157 This is in marked contrast to the HRRT's good level of 
experience in privacy issues. 
152 See Department for Courts, above n 143 , 50. 
153 Most of the statutory causes of action are listed in the first schedule of the Disputes Tribunals Act 
1988. 
154 "The Disputes Tribunals of New Zealand", above n 100, 35. 
155 See New Zealand Law Commission Seeking Solutions: Options for change to the New Zealand 
Court System (NZLC PP52, Wellington , 2002) 144 ["Seeking Solutions: Options for change to the 
New Zealand Court System"]. 
156 The Disputes Tribunals Act 1988 s I 0( I )(c) restricts the jurisdiction of Disputes Tribunals to torts 
involving property. See Metrowater Ltd v Disputes Tribunal [ 1999] 13 PRNZ 532, 535 (HC) 
Williams J. 
157 The Law Commission found that out of 56 referees sitting in 2002 a quarter were legally 
qualified: "Delivering Justice for All: a Vision for New Zealand Courts and Tribunals", above n 85, 
159. 
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An option is to provide specific training on privacy matters for referees. In 
recent years, the Ministry of Justice has placed a greater emphasis on the training of 
referees. The Disputes Tribunals Amendment Act 1998 allowed for the 
appointment of a Principal Disputes Referee, the objective of this appointment was 
to improve training for and provide more support to referees. 
158 In addition, The 
Open Polytechnic of New Zealand runs a training programme that newly appointed 
referees attend. 159 Referees are appointed for a three-year term without an 
automatic right of renewal, 160 having some knowledge of privacy issues could be 
part of the basis of the selection of new appointees. If there were a steady turnover 
of referees, over a period of time Disputes Tribunals would have the ability to hear 
privacy matters because of the arrival of privacy literate referees. Another option 
may be to have referees that specialise in privacy matters to hear privacy related 
cases. However, referees generally operate in a particular geographic area. 161 This 
means that it would be difficult to have "floating" referees who are privacy 
specialists that travelled to hear privacy cases. 
There are monetary limits on Dispute Tribunal's jurisdiction that limits any 
claim for damages. 162 However, even the basic limit of $7,500 would cover most 
damages awards in access disputes, based on damage awards in cases such as 
Proceedings Commissioner v Health Waikato where a total of $8,000 was 
awarded. 163 Assuming Proceedings Commissioner v Health Waikato represents the 
high end of access disputes, then monetary jurisdiction is not a barrier to most 
access disputes being heard by Disputes Tribunals. Nevertheless, the monetary 
jurisdiction of Disputes Tribunals is significantly less than the HRRT that can 
award up to $200,000. 164 
Currently, Disputes Tribunals take a relaxed approach to evidential 
requirements. The Disputes Tribunals Act 1988 allows any relevant advice or 
158 T his became Disputes Tribunals Act 1988, s 6A. 
159 "The Disputes Tribunals of New Zealand", above n 100, 20. 
160 "The Disputes Tribunals of New Zealand", above n 100, 23 . 
161 "The Disputes Tribunals of New Zealand" , above n 100, 15. 
162 Disputes Tribunals Act 1988 s I O sets the monetary limit of claims at $7,500. Section 12 allows 
the jurisdiction of a Disputes Tribunal to be extended to $12,000 if both parties agree. 
163 Proceedings Commissioner v Health Waikato (2000) 6 HRNZ 274, 291 (HC) Smellie J . 
164 Human Rights Act 1993, s 92Q. 
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information to be taken into account irrespective of whether the advice or 
infomrntion would be admissible in a court of law. 165 This procedural flexibility is 
also found in the HRRT. The benefit of the Disputes Tribunals approach is that 
hearings are not overly legalistic and that parties do not need knowledge of legal 
processes when they appear before a Disputes Tribunal. The negative effect of this 
is that referees are not necessarily familiar with the normal rules of evidence. If 
access to information matters were to be considered by Disputes Tribunals, referees 
may well deal with some complex decisions whether to allow access to documents 
covered by legal professional privilege and documents containing information 
belonging to other individuals or trade secrets. Caution would be required to ensure 
mistakes are avoided or that incorrect decisions were not made. While the HRRT 
takes a similar approach to procedural matters, the HRRT has experience in privacy 
issues and its decisions can be appealed. This raises the issue of whether greater 
appeal rights from the decisions of Disputes Tribunals would be warranted. 
Currently, the right to appeal against a decision of a Disputes Tribunal is very 
limited. 166 Appeals are only allowed where the hearing was conducted unfairly, not 
on matters of fact or law. 167 As the Law Commission has stated: 168 
Decisions can only be questioned where the referee has conducted the hearing itself 
unfairly and the appellant has been prejudiced. The merits of the decision are out of 
bounds. The referee may have got the facts wrong, or the Jaw wrong, but nothing 
can be done about that. 
The Law Commission's report Delivering Justice for All: a Vision for New 
Zealand Courts and Tribunals recommends the maintenance of the limited right of 
appeal in Disputes Tribunals. 169 However, the Law Commission does not consider 
appeal rights for Disputes Tribunals in detail and states if there were wider appeal 
rights that "[p ]arties with more time or resources to wear down the other side could 
abuse the appeal process."170 The Law Commission report also claims that surveys 
have shown that users are happy with the current Disputes Tribunals system but 
165 Disputes Tribunals Act 1988, s 40. 
166 Disputes Tribunal Act 1988 s 50( I); see also "The Disputes Tribunals of ew Zealand" , above n 
100, 125. 
167 NZ! /11sura11ce v. District Court at Auckland [ 1993] 3 NZLR 453, 458 (HC) Thorpe J. 
168 "Seeking Solutions: Options for change to the New Zealand Court System", above n 155 , 144. 
169 "Delivering Justice for All: a Vision for New Zealand Courts and Tribunals", above n 85, 160. 
170 "Delivering Justice for All: a Vision for New Zealand Courts and Tribunals", above n 85 , 160. 
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does not quote the surveys or detail the survey findings.
171 Maintaining the limited 
right of appeal would have the benefit of minimising appeals being used as a 
delaying tactic to stall the release of information. However, if a two-stream 
approach for access disputes were to use Disputes Tribunals for one stream, the 
appeal provisions of the Disputes Tribunals Act 1988 would have to be revised. It 
would be unfair for parties using the Disputes Tribunals stream to have appeal 
rights that were far more limited than those using the Office of the Privacy 
Commissioner. Having different appeal rights for different types of disputes heard 
by Disputes Tribunals would create procedural problems. It would be rational for 
complainants to state claims as having a privacy aspect so as to take advantage of 
the wider appeal provisions. 
Disputes Tribunals have a nation-wide presence and a monetary jurisdiction 
that would cover most access to personal information claims. The flexible 
procedure of Disputes Tribunals is positive and analogous to the HRR T. The harsh 
restrictions on appeal rights would create inequalities with complainants using the 
Office of the Privacy Commissioner. Addressing the lack of knowledge on privacy 
law in Disputes Tribunals would have to be a priority. In summary, expecting 
Disputes Tribunals to hear privacy claims is really taking a court set up to deal with 
small claims of a general legal nature and trying to adapt it to a relatively 
specialised role. 
E District Courts 
A process to deal with access and release disputes could be built into the 
existing interlocutory application process in the District Court system. 172 
Essentially, District Court privacy hearings would operate along the lines of an 
interlocutory application, 173 though perhaps in a less formal manner such as in the 
judge's chambers. 174 If matters were heard in chambers, then the privacy of the 
17 1 "Delivering Justice for All: a Vision for New Zealand Courts and Tribuna ls", above n 85 , 160. 
172 For a succinct background on District Courts see "Seeking Solutions: Options for change to the 
New Zealand Court System", above n 155 , 156. 
173 High Court Rule 3; District Court Rule 3. 
174 For a discussion on interlocutory applications see Beck, above n 1333, 162. For an outline on 
hearings in Chambers see "Seeking Solutions: Options for change to the New Zealand Court 
System", above n 155, 154. 
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parties would be protected and consistency maintained with complaints heard by 
the Office of the Privacy Commissioner. If forms were designed in a user-friendly 
manner, the need for legal representation would be reduced. The applicant would 
have to apply for a hearing through the court registry and serve notice on the other 
party. Alternatively, the Registrar could serve the notice on the other party, as is 
currently the case with Disputes Tribunals. This process envisages both parties 
being present for the hearing. 
Ex parte applications in privacy matters would not be fair on the parties. It is 
difficult to see how an ex parte application could work in a privacy matter, as both 
parties would generally need to be present - the individual and the agency. 
Conceivably, the main use for an ex parte application would be to stop the release 
of information in a common law or contractual situation. This is not really required 
as injunctions already provide a tool for preventing release of information. 
It is reasonable to expect that as District Court Judges are experienced 
lawyers, they would be conversant with rules of evidence and be able to apply the 
Privacy Act 1993. This knowledge advantage makes District Courts a more 
attractive option to hear access to personal information complaints than Disputes 
Tribunals. 
Should the Law Commission proposal for a Community Court as set out in 
the Delivering Justice for All: A Vision for New Zealand Courts and Tribunals 
report be adopted, the hearing of privacy applications would fit within the proposed 
monetary jurisdictional limit of $50,000. 175 The Law Commission's proposals that 
Community Court fees and processes reflect low value civil claims adds to the 
attraction of the dispute resolution model utilising the District Court if the Law 
Commission's recommendations were to be adopted. 176 
175 "Delivering Justice for All: a Vision for New Zealand Courts and Tribunals", above n 85 , 118. 
176 "Delivering Justice for All: a Vision for New Zealand Courts and Tribunals", above n 85 , 118. 
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F Operation of District Court Privacy Hearings 
In the hearing, the respondent would be obliged to provide the documents in 
question to the judge for review. In the interests of speed and efficiency, the judge 
should be provided with a copy of the documents before the hearing. If the 
information sought did not exist, the respondent would be obliged to provide a 
statutory declaration that there was no such document. 
Both parties would have the opportunity at the hearing to make 
representations to justify their point of view. As information privacy principle six 
of the Privacy Act 1993 contains an entitlement of access to personal information, 
the respondent would have the greater effort to oppose access. 
Sensible precautions would need to be taken at the hearing. For example, in a 
dispute over disclosing a document that was withheld because part of the document 
contained personal information belonging to another person, the party requesting 
the information would not be allowed to view the document until the judge had 
ruled on the document. A useful check would be to allow District Courts to refer 
an application for access to the Office of the Privacy Commissioner if the judge 
believed the application was better suited to an investigative style of dispute 
resolution. This power might be exercised in a situation where there was a large 
number of documents to consider and it would take some time to work through 
them. 
To make the District Court option easier for people seeking to file privacy 
claims, District Court forms for privacy matters would need to be designed in a way 
so as to be readily usable by lay people. The existing fonns for Disputes Tribunal 
hearings where it is a matter of the parties "filling in the gaps" would be a useful 
starting point to design user-friendly forms . It would be of benefit to all users of 
District Courts if court forms were made easier to use - designing new forms for 
access to personal information disputes could be the starting point for this. 
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G The Cost of District Court Hearings 
The fees for interlocutory applications in District Courts are currently set at 
$185. 177 This is considerably more than Disputes Tribunal filing fee 
178 or the free 
service provided by the Office of the Privacy Commissioner. The trade-off against 
the cost of the District Court fee for the party seeking information is the potential to 
save time by using the District Court process. It may be cost effective for a party 
using a lawyer to pay the interlocutory application fee rather than persist through 
the Office of the Privacy Commissioner. A party using a lawyer runs the risk that 
the Privacy Commissioner's recommendation will not be accepted by the other 
party and then having to seek an HRRT hearing, all of which will incur time and 
legal fees. 
The Privacy Commissioner made a submission to the Working Party on Civil 
Courts Fees. 179 The Working Party on Civil Court Fees was reviewing court 
fees. 180 In the submission, the Privacy Commissioner opposed the proposed 
imposition of a $400 filing fee for the HRRT. A $400 fee was seen as being a 
barrier to accessing the HRRT for litigants in person. The Privacy Commissioner 
made the rather generalised observation that a $400 filing fee would tip "[t]he 
balance of power between a complainant and a respondent will decisively move in 
favour of respondents." The Privacy Commissioner proposed that a filing fee in 
line with the top of the Disputes Tribunal filing fee range of $100 would be more 
appropriate. This figure is not too far removed from the District Court interlocutory 
application fee of $185 in the model this paper is proposing. 
177 Ministry of Justice <www.justice.govt.nz> (last accessed 28 July 2004). 
178 These fees start at $30. See Ministry of Justice <www.justice.govt.n z> (l ast accessed 28 Jul y 
2004) . 
179"Submission on review of Civil Court Fees: Stage Two - Human Rights Review Tribunal", above 
n 150. 
180 See Department for Courts <http://www.courts.govt.nzJpubs/ reports/2004/c ivil-
court/ introduction.html> (last accessed 8 October 2004). 
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H Lega/Aid 
Allowing Privacy Act 1993 claims in District Courts would mean that 
applicants have the potential to be covered by the legal aid scheme. Legal aid is 
available for civil claims and can be obtained promptly. The Legal Services 
Agency administers the legal aid scheme. In the 2002 to 2003 year, the Legal 
Services Agency processed 82. 7 per cent of applications for legal aid in civil cases 
within 15 days. 181 If access to information claims under the Privacy Act 1993 were 
an accepted part of the jurisdiction of District Courts, then not only would a 
complainant be able to apply for legal aid to cover the costs of the hearing but also 
for their lawyers' time beforehand. Someone seeking access to personal 
information though the District Court may be able to include the cost of the 
application into the costs of a wider case. 
VI CONCLUSION: WHO SHOULD DECIDE? 
Having Disputes Tribunals hearing privacy applications would be a major 
expansion of their current jurisdiction. The Disputes Tribunals Act 1988 would 
need to be amended in areas such as evidence and appeals. It would be unfair for 
both complainants and agencies if Disputes Tribunals were used for access 
applications if applications made through Disputes Tribunals did not have appeal 
rights whereas those made through the Office of the Privacy Commissioner could 
be appealed. Training would need to be provided to referees on the Privacy Act 
1993. 
Having the HRRT hearing applications for access to personal information in 
the first instance would be a significant amendment to the cunent structure. The 
HRRT is currently the appellant tribunal for decisions of the Privacy 
Commissioner, the Human Rights Commission and the Health and Disability 
Services Commissioner. Currently, there is a consistent approach for complaints 
across all three bodies. As discussed, while the HRRT utilises District Court 
facilities, the HRRT does not have a permanent presence at every District Court and 
18 1 Legal Services Agency Annual Report 2002 - 2003 (E7, Wellington, 2003) 48. 
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the HRR T administration is centralised in Wellington. This reduces the 
ath·activeness of the HRRT as a practical proposition to promptly hear applications; 
a person could not walk in off the street and fill in an HRRT application. It would 
be prohibitive from a cost perspective for the HRRT to travel around New Zealand 
at short notice to hear every application for accessing personal information. 
The most attractive option is to use District Courts. District Courts already 
have judges who are skilled in dealing with evidence and who have considerable 
legal experience. District Courts have an existing procedure in the shape of 
interlocutory applications that would not require significant modification to deal 
with access to personal information disputes. However, if the option was to work, 
then workflows and District Court funding would need review to ensure the 
potential efficiencies are realised. 
A Legislative Changes to the Privacy Act 1993 
To allow a two stream system for access to personal infom1ation disputes , 
some amendments to the Privacy Act 1993 would be required. 
182 Currently, there 
is a general rule in section 11 (2) of the Privacy Act 1993 that the information 
privacy principles do not confer legal rights that are enforceable in courts of law. 
183 
There is an exception to this rule contained in section 11(1).
184 There is a legal 
right that is enforceable in a court of law for accessing personal information held by 
a state sector agency. The Privacy Act 1993 does not contain any specific 
provisions to prevent double jeopardy from a complaint using both a court and the 
Office of the Privacy Commissioner process to access information held by a state 
sector agency. Presumably, the Privacy Commissioner could discontinue an 
investigation using the discretionary powers contained in section 71 if a 
182 The 1997 review of the Privacy Act 1997 raised the issue as to whether the courts should ha ve 
greater jurisdiction in access complaints. Of the seven submissions that commented on this point , 
six opposed the idea. However, detailed analysis of the submissions is difficult because responses 
were generally just "no". The Wellington City Council supported a fast track option. See Privacy 
Commissioner Review of the Privacy Act 1993: Public Submissions Volume Two: DP6 - DPJ 2 
(Privacy Commissioner, 1998). 
183 See R v Harris [2000] 2 NZLR 524, 527 (CA) Keith J for the Court . Parties can formulate claims 
so as to bring actions in other jurisdictions. See Paul Roth, Privacy Law and Practice Lex isNexus 
ew Zealand Limited, Wellington , 2003 , para I 011.5 service No 25 May 2000. 
184 For a background to the rationale for this exception see "Necessary and Desirable: Privacy Act 
1993 Review: Report of the Privacy Commissioner on the First Periodic Review of the operation of 
the Privacy Act", above n 65 , I 07 . 
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complainant had tried unsuccessfully to access their personal information through 
the court system and then complained to the Office of the Privacy Commissioner. 
To allow a two-stream process for accessing personal information held by any 
agency, section 11 (1) would need to be amended so that information privacy 
principle six would confer a right of access to personal information enforceable in a 
court against any agency. It would be a simple drafting process to remove "public 
sector" from section 11 (1) so that there was a consistent approach for accessing all 
personal information irrespective of whether the information was held in the public 
or private sector. A further refinement to section 11(1) would be the ability for a 
District Court Judge to refer the complaint to the Office of the Privacy 
Commissioner if the Judge believed the complaint was one that was more suitable 
to being investigated by the Privacy Commissioner. This subsection could read: 
(3) where an application is made to a District Court in reliance on subsection (I) 
the District Court may order that the matter be referred to the Commissioner 
for the Commissioner to undertake an investigation under Part 8 if it sees fit. 
By integrating the two methods of dispute resolution using a new subsection 
11 (3) a degree of judicial control can be maintained over the dispute resolution 
process rather than an unfettered choice for the complainant. I would expect 
subsection 11 (3) to be utilised by a District Court in situations where it became 
apparent at the hearing the matter involved other Information Privacy Principles. 
Alternatively, a District Court judge may refer the matter to the Privacy 
Commissioner if it became apparent at the hearing that there was a substantial 
amount of information to work through and the hearing would not allow enough 
time to do so. 
To prevent double jeopardy situations arising, section 71 (1) could be 
amended with the addition of a new subsection stating: "the complainant has 
already pursued an action in the District Court under section 11(1) for subject-
matter of the complaint." Clarifying section 71 means that parties to a complaint 
will have certainty as to whether a complaint can be relitigated. The amendment 
also addresses the potential in the Privacy Act 1993 as it currently stands for a 
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complainant to use both the complaints process through the Office of the Privacy 
Commissioner and then take a further action against a public sector agency under 
section 11 (1 ). 
VII CONCLUSION 
The Privacy Commissioner should be the Rock of Gibraltar standing fast 
against incursions on the privacy of the individual, be they from government or the 
private sector. Ideally, the Privacy Commissioner's focus should be on privacy 
issues that affect all or a significant part of the community rather than be directed at 
smaller disputes involving an individual or a small group of individuals . This 
concept is the starting point for this paper. 
By providing another option for complainants seeking resolution in access to 
personal information related privacy complaints through District Courts, there is the 
potential to ease the overall complaints workload in the Office of the Privacy 
Commissioner. This has several benefits. A reduced workload may mean that 
other complaints can be dealt with faster. Currently, additional funding is provided 
to the Office of the Privacy Commissioner over two years so that longstanding 
complaints can be resolved. 185 There is no guarantee that this additional funding 
will continue. By giving complainants the option to use the court system some 
taxpayers ' money may be saved as the user bears more of the costs in the court 
system, rather than more funding provided to the Office of the Privacy 
Commissioner. 
If the number of complaints handled by the Office of the Privacy 
Commissioner reduced with a two-stream option for access to personal information 
complaints, then the Privacy Commissioner could reallocate resources to legislative 
and policy issues. Legislative and policy issues have the potential to affect a wide 
number of New Zealanders and are arguably more important from a public interest 
perspective than resolving complaints that may only affect one person. 
185 "Report of the Privacy Commissioner for the Year Ended 30 June 2003 ", above n 2, 21 . 
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A two-stream approach for access to information disputes would provide 
greater flexibility for people to access their personal information. Provided there is 
the option to choose between the free services offered by the Privacy Commissioner 
and paying to use the District Court service, a two-stream approach does not 
impose a cost barrier to obtaining personal information. Costs must be viewed as 
more than just direct costs such as court fees. Indirect costs arising from delays in 
the complaints service need to be considered. 
As only access to personal information complaints are covered by the 
proposed two-stream system then there is the minimal chance for inconsistencies 
between District Courts and the Privacy Commissioner or the Human Rights 
Review Tribunal. The right of access to personal information in the Privacy Act 
1993 is not changed under this proposal. Access situations are fact based; deciding 
whether a document falls into one of the narrow exceptions to availability is done 
on a case by case basis. It would be highly unlikely that two complainants would 
be seeking access to exactly the same document from the same agency and then 
receive different results from the two complaints processes that are proposed. If 
one party was unhappy with the decision of the District Court, they could appeal to 
the High Court as is the case at present with the Human Rights Review Tribunal. 
The Privacy Commissioner's annual repo1i should provide more detailed 
financial reporting. The Report of the Privacy Commissioner for the year ended 30 
June 2003 does not even provide the cost for each of the output classes provided to 
the Crown. 186 The reporting of the average cost to resolve complaints would allow 
different options for dealing with privacy complaints to be compared and for 
informed decision making to take place. The average cost of resolving complaints 
is reported by the Ombudsman. In the year to June 2003 , each completed Official 
Information Act 1982 complaint was estimated to have cost $1 ,195 .
187 If the 
Ombudsman can provide this level of reporting, so should the Privacy 
Commissioner. 
186 "Report of the Privacy Commissioner for the Year Ended 30 June 2003", above n 2, 145 . 
187 Report of the Ombudsmen for the Year Ended 30 June 2003, above n 55,) 54. 
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The proposed amendments to the Privacy Act clarify the legislation and 
provide a flexible system for complainants while still allowing judicial control so 
that the flexibility is not untrammelled. I would recommend that the Privacy Act 
1993 be amended accordingly. 
Access to personal information complaints have proven to be the consistently 
largest single category of complaints. This paper recognises this fact and has 
proposed a system that gives complainants a chance to have their complaints 
resolved while still maintaining the current rights that the Privacy Act 1993 confers. 
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